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DOES SEIFERT'S PERSONALISM HOLD WATER? 
 
 
By Rocco Buttiglione

 
Does Seifert's personalism hold water? (1) The question is rather 
provocative but my answer will be clear: yes, it does. Not only it holds water but 
can be continued and stands in need of being continued. This paper will put 
Seifert within the phenomenological tradition and in particular within the 
tradition of realistic phenomenology. Then we will describe Seifert's discovery 
and its meaning for contemporary philosophy. In the end, we will defend why we 
think it can be continued and stands in need of being continued and in which 
direction it should be continued. 
 
I. Seifert within the phenomenological tradition 
 
Max Scheler has put the experience of values in the centre of the philosophical 
attention. We perceive the reality around us charged with values and the 
perception of the object is accompanied by the perception of the value. Kant had 
considered human emotions as obstacles to the discovery of the truth. Scheler 
tells us that emotions are an essential component of our perception of reality. We 
discover reality (and moral reality in particular) in our emotions and through our 
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emotions. This discovery introduces us to a world, which is thoroughly different 
from the moral world of Kant and of Hume. Think for example of the famous 
"natural fallacy" of Hume: you cannot derive an ‘ought judgement’ from an ‘is 
judgement. Scheler could answer that moral judgements are not derived from 
judgement’ of fact. They are given together with judgement of fact. They possess 
an inner intimate relation with judgement of facts but this relation is not that of a 
logical deduction. 
The discovery of value leads us towards the person. In this sense, Scheler is 
one of the main sources of modern personalism, as John Crosby has recently and 
so convincingly pointed out. The values are perceived in the person, and they 
constitute the interiority of the person. The person is the space constituted by the 
values. So far Scheler. 
One point is not, however, in Scheler completely clear. The person is both the 
stage upon which the values are projected and within which they are perceived. 
However, is the person a value in them self? Moreover, if the person is a value in 
them self which kind of value are they? 
It seems that in Scheler the person is the condition of all values but is not a 
value in them self. The values appear in the experience of the person, and in this 
very experience are consumed and disappear. One could make a comparison 
between Scheler and Sigieri of Brabant. In Sigieri, the person in the act of 
knowledge participates of the "intellectus possibilis" and the act of knowledge 
takes place in the person. The act does not remain in the person and does not enter 
to constitute the substance of the person. The act takes place in the person but is 
not an act of the person.  
It seems that the situation is similar in Scheler as what regards the knowledge 
of values. Scheler could be an averroist of values. I use the dubitative form "could 
be" and not the affirmative "is" because it is not always clear what Scheler really 
means and it is equally unclear whether he has remained of the same opinion 
throughout his philosophical career. 
Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla have made one step forward. 
They have done in relation to Scheler the same operation St. Thomas Aquinas has 
done with Sigieri. Aquinas says  "hic homo intelligit," the person is the subject 
of the act of the intellect. Von Hildebrand and Wojtyla say: "this man is the 
subject of the experience of the values." 
This is possible because the person is a substance and the act remains in the 
substance and changes the substance. I shall not deal now with the differences 
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between von Hildebrand and Wojtyla on this point. It suffices to say that Wojtyla 
relies more directly upon the Aristotelian concept of substance and upon the 
Aristotelian metaphysics of potency and act. The substance is the precondition of 
the act, in the sense that it contains the potency of that act. Moreover, the act 
remains in the substance, meaning through the act the substance is perfected 
through the fulfillment of its potency or remains unfulfilled and misses its due 
perfection.  
If we consider the person as substance, we make one fundamental step 
towards a personalistic philosophy. Now the person is no more just the stage on 
which the experience of values takes place. Now the person is a value in herself 
and all values experienced by the person remain in the person and qualify the 
person. The destiny of the person is that to summarize in herself all values 
through her experience of the world. This changes also the way in which we see 
values and obliges us to take a certain distance from Scheler on the decisive issue 
of duty.  
Scheler does not love the idea of duty. It seems to him to contain an element 
of Pharisee morality. Von Hildebrand has stressed the idea of Gebührenbeziehung. 
The Gebühren is a duty, yet a particular kind of duty, clearly different from the 
Solenn of Kantian morality. It is a kind of completely passive duty. Imagine 
Hamlet watching the performance of Euripides’ drama The Women of Troy. He 
clearly perceives that compassion is due to these women who are so disgraced 
without any fault of their own. Compassion is due in particular to Ecuba. The 
compassion due to Ecuba exemplifies a Gebührenbeziehung in its purity because 
it does not imply any active involvement of the person. There are values and 
relations among values that do not concern in any way living, really existing 
persons. This is the reason why Hamlet asks of the actor: "what is he to Ecuba or 
Ecuba to him?" Than Hamlet draws a comparison to another tragedy, his own 
tragedy. Here we find again a Gebürenbeziehung: compassion is due do the 
assassinated father of Hamlet. Compassion but also justice as well as a 
punishment is objectively due to the unfaithful wife and to the murderous brother. 
This time, however, we have not just a Gebührenbeziehung. We have something 
more. Hamlet as an acting subject, as the son of the victim and the legal heir of 
his kingly power, has the responsibility of giving everybody his or her due. The 
recognition of the person as substance (subject. The two words share the same 
etymological meaning. Substare, subiacere in Latin means to lay under) and as 
value implies that the person as value is consigned to the person as subject as a 
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responsibility and as a task. Now we discover from the experience of the 
Gebührenbeziehung the experience of duty as responsibility for the the value of 
my own person. In this discovery is contained something that overcomes the 
traditional understanding of eudemonism that has opposed often Thomists to 
realist phenomenologists. The interest to myself or to my self-realization is not 
egoistic. It is rather an assumption of responsibility for the value of my person. 
This value is entrusted to me in a unique way. To better understand this 
experience we may look at the example of a man who is in love with a woman. 
He has married this woman and has children with her. He lives himself and has 
the experience of himself in the relation to the persons he loves. He takes care of 
himself, not because of the egoistic relation to himself, but because of his love for 
his wife and children. There is a non-egoistic relation of man to himself if this is 
mediated through the relationship to others. 
This relation does not imply only the subject but the totality of the world of 
values. Values appear and manifest themselves in the person and through the 
person. The responsibility for the value of the person contains in itself the 
responsibility for the totality of the world of values as far as they are entrusted to 
the person. All values are entrusted to the person, to each human person. They are 
not entrusted to each person in the same way. Each one is in one sense the centre 
of the world of values, and these values are entrusted to each person in a unique 
way. Let us consider again the case of the loving husband and father. He is 
sensible to the value of all children of the world, but he is responsible for his own 
children in a way which is different from that in which he is responsible for all 
the children of the world. There is an axiological order of values if you consider 
them in themselves and there is a different order of values if you consider them as 
objective goods for the person, that is if you consider the way and the order in 
which they are entrusted to the responsibility of each human person.  
At this stage the personalist philosophy encounters the great tradition of 
Neoplatonism and of the Italian Renaissance philosophy of Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola or of Leonardo da Vinci. Man is a microcosm which reproduces in 
itself the macrocosm. The totality of the values is reflected, and also realized, in a 
unique way in the life of each human person. Each human person decides through 
the acts of their life the meaning of the whole universe. Since the acts remain 
within the person, each person becomes, in one sense, the whole universe in a 
unique perspective. 
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II. The Philosophical Discovery of Josef Seifert 
 
Through Wojtyla (and von Hildebrand) we have discovered the person as 
substance. Josef Seifert draws upon, in one sense, the consequences of this 
discovery. What is the impact on metaphysics and ontology of the fact that the 
person is a substance? In one sense we could say that the process of the thought 
of Seifert is opposite (and complementary) to that of Wojtyla. Wojtyla uses the 
ontology of Aristoteles and St. Thomas to give a firmer foundation to the 
phenomenological discovery of the person and to deepen in this way our 
interpretation of the phenomenological evidence regarding the person. Seifert 
goes from the person to ontology and asks the question: how must we change and 
integrate our general ontological concepts in order to formulate at the level of 
ontology the consequences of the discovery of the person? 
The person is not a being like all other beings which possess the quality of 
being in the same way. This quality is possessed and expressed differently in all 
other beings. This is a break in the history of ontology. Since Parmenides we have 
been thinking that things either are or are not, and being is essentially equalitarian: 
the same in all and always equal to itself. Plato, especially if you read him 
according to the new interpretation of the Tübingen School and of Reale, already 
introduces a difference. You can consider being as it is in itself in its ideal form, 
and you can consider being as you see it in the things of this world that are a 
defective reproduction of the real being. The ideal being is the real being and the 
being of this world is a faint imitation of the real being. St. Augustine teaches us 
the centrality of the idea of order. Not only is there a difference between ideal and 
empirical being, but beings have among themselves a hierarchy of order. Dante 
has expressed this idea in beautiful verses: 
 
Le cose tutte quante 
Hanno ordine fra loro e questa è forma  
Che l'Universo a Dio fa simigliante.  
(All things have order among them and this is the form which makes the 
Universe similar to God). 
 
There is here a difference between the Being of God and the Being of the 
Universe. God possesses in Himself the totality of Being, and this totality in the 
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created world constitutes an analogy to the Being of God. Cornelio Fabro has 
stressed that in St. Thomas Aquinas the notion of actus essendi gives to this 
distinction further insight: God possesses Being as act and communicates the 
perfection of being to all things in so far as they are. 
One problem remains open: what is the place of the human person in the 
order of being? Does man participate being in the same way in which all living 
things participate being? In one sense - yes. Man receives being as well as all 
other created beings. Man however as person participates in another sense of the 
creative act of God. Through his actions man creates the order of values that 
constitutes his own person. He creates the whole of the world in so far as the 
whole world is reproduced in his interiority through his acts and transformed in 
the exterior material dimension through his work. The person is creative in man 
in a way that is analogous to that in which the person of God is creative.  
The person gives us then an access to Being, which is different from the 
access to Being given to us by all other objects of the earth. This is in one sense 
also the meaning of the vision of man as microcosm. Seifert makes one decisive 
step forward along this route. He says “Being is Person.” Let us try to exfoliate 
different levels of meaning for this expression. 
At the first level “God is Person.” In Plato (and in Aristotle) this is not so 
clear. In Plato the divinity is not of theos. It is rather to theion. The use of the 
neutral form implies that God is not a person or should be understood beyond all 
categories, the category of person included. O theos is the lesser God, the 
Demiurgos, who shape the objects of this world according to the pure forms 
contained in the divine. For Christians, it may seem natural to think the 
Demiurgos and the divine are one and the same. St. John tells us that the Logos 
(Word) of God, through Whom all things were done, is one and the same with the 
Father. But shall we consider this formulation as a pure object of Christian 
revelation, which as such, stands beyond the realm of philosophical reflection? 
The phenomenological research on the person allows us to discover a particular 
richness of content of the person - as the place in which all values are reflected 
but are also substantiated through the acts of the person. This specific wealth of 
the person leads Seifert to qualify personhood (the fact of being a person) as pure 
perfection. Since God is the subject of all pure perfections than God must possess 
also the perfection of personhood, and then “God is a Person.” How could God 
communicate to man, the perfection of personhood, if he did not possess this 
perfection Himself? Pure perfection is a quality which is always better to possess 
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than not to possess. Such pure perfections are beauty, truth and goodness. Such a 
perfection is also the Person in a particularly eminent way, since beauty, truth and 
goodness are fully themselves in the person. Another pure Perfection is oneness, 
to which the other pure perfections are inherent. Now the person qualifies the one. 
God is one as person, is the absolute person or is person in a unique and 
incomparable way. “Being is Person” means that “God is Person.” 
The second level is that Man is Person (although in a lesser form) and 
therefore man is being in a way incomparable to that in which other created 
objects are beings. Man, for instance, is a subject as a person, and human 
subjectivity as such has a specific ontological consistency and a peculiar structure. 
It belongs to personhood - a particular openness. The person is substance, but at 
the same time relation to other persons. Man is a person in relation to God and is 
creative in this relation and together with God. This overcomes a difficulty that is 
proper to many forms of existentialist philosophy and also of German idealism. 
They thought that either God or man is creative and free. This implies however a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the person who is creative and 
free in the relation to others. The reception of the gift of being from God implies a 
certain passivity but also a certain activity or an act of freedom in the relation to 
God. “Being is Person” means that man is being in a unique way, incomparable to 
that of all objects of the earth. 
The third level is that human experience gives us an inroad into the intimate 
structure of being which is incomparably wealthier than that offered by formal 
ontology. According to a long and established tradition primo quod cadit in 
intentione est ens. The starting point of the ontological reflection is then Being in 
the sense of ‘what is the object.’ Seifert now suggests that the person is a better 
starting point. Being as revealed in the person tells much more about oneself. The 
experience of value is clearly linked with the experience of the person, is one of 
the main components of the experience of the person. All this becomes relevant 
for the inquiry into the essence of Being in a way which could not be imagined 
within the framework of traditional ontology. The explanation of Being must take 
into account the experience of the person, and Being must contain in itself the 
potentiality of what appears in the experience of the person. Traditional ontology 
begins with the ontos on, or the quality of being an object in the most abstract and 
general form. Seifert suggests that we should put in the centre of our ontological 
investigation the on chat'exochèn, Being in its most elevated form in which it 
manifests itself with the utmost depth. 
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The inroad into the realm of Being begins with the person. This has 
important consequences for the methodology of ontological investigation. The 
ontos on stands in a certain contiguity with the formal object of physics and more 
broadly with those of natural sciences. A traditional interpretation of Aristotelian 
metaphysics sees a certain continuity between Aristotelian physics and 
Aristotelian metaphysics. The crisis of modernity begins, among other things, 
with the assumption that the crisis of Aristotelian physics involves Aristotelian 
metaphysics. Now Seifert suggests that the being that stands at the beginning of 
metaphysics is completely independent upon being in the sense in which it is the 
formal object of natural sciences. This is an actio finium regundorum (procedure 
determining the borders) between natural sciences and philosophy that eliminates 
all possibility of contradiction. Natural sciences cannot say anything neither in 
favor nor against, for example, the existence of God. This approach is absolutely 
modern, very similar to that of Descartes. In Descartes also being is found in the 
experience of the human subject and the movement beginning with the finite 
(human) subject ends with the infinite Subject of God through the ontological 
argument. Not by chance we find in Seifert also the ontological argument in the 
centre of metaphysics. There are, of course, many differences between the 
Cartesian approach and that of Seifert. The most important one is perhaps the fact 
that in Descartes the subject remains an abstract ego while in Seifert the subject is 
a person and has all the wealth of determinations that phenomenology (and 
especially realist phenomenology) detects in the person. 
 
III. In which Directions Should the Personalist Vessel Steer its Course?  
Some Suggestions for Young Philosophers. 
 
We come now to the last and most controversial part of this contribution. I do not 
know if Josef Seifert agrees with this interpretation of his philosophy. Even less 
sure I am that he will agree with my suggestion of possible paths to continue his 
philosophical work. I take however this liberty because I have led for thirty years 
(in presence or at a distance) an intensive dialogue with Seifert.  
It appears Seifert's personalism gives us a new foundation of modern 
philosophy which reconciles it with the classical heritage. For a long while we 
have been used to oppossing classical philosophy to modern philosophy as if they 
were two opposite forms of thought which cannot in any way be reconciled with 
one another: classical objectivism vs modern subjectivism. One philosophy 
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begins with being (primo quod cadit in intentione ext ens), the other with the 
subject (cogito ergo sum). Now we find two unexpected moves in Seifert: the first 
one tells us that Man is Person (not only subject), the second one says that Being 
is Person. 
Does the name of another philosopher come to your mind who may have said 
something similar to (but at the same time thoroughly different from) this in the 
past? G.W.F. Hegel, of course. He said that the conscience (the subject) is 
substance (the object). 
You do not find many quotations of Hegel in the works of Seifert, and it is 
not difficult to understand why. Seifert is an international philosopher but remains 
100% Austrian at heart. Hegel was never very popular in Austria. Hegel was a 
kind of official philosopher of the Kingdom of Prussia. He was a Suabian by birth 
but ended his career as professor in Berlin. His philosophy can be seen as a 
prophesy of a Protestant/Prussian/German unification and a new German/Prussian 
stage in the history of civilization. In the Austrian empire these ideas could not be 
met with great enthusiasm. They wanted a Catholic/Austrian unification and were 
the major opponents of Prussian hegemony. Austrian philosophy remains hostile 
to Hegel and to German idealism in general (with a partial exception for 
Schelling). It is rather the ‘broth culture’ from which, in the end, phenomenology 
will emerge. 
It is of course apparent that between Hegel and Seifert there are enormous 
differences. I believe they all lead back to one fundamental divergence that is the 
same which opposes Seifert to Descartes. This divergence is the concept of the 
Person. Hegel sees the human subject as relationship but does not see the person 
as substance or as substance in relationship. The result is immanentism and 
totalism. 
The relation obtaining between God and man must become indistinct and 
immanentism must arise in which both the transcendence of God and the 
autonomy and responsibility of man ‘go lost.’ Man, on the other hand, is seen just 
as a member of the social totality and the ontical priority of the person vs the state 
goes equally lost. 
It is undeniable however, that Hegel has developed an enormous wealth of 
concepts that help us to understand the human world, the world of human action, 
of history and of politics. Large parts of the human sciences depend (although 
human scientists do not like to admit this) upon the Hegelian conceptual heritage. 
A traditional defect of the classical philosophy has been a certain incapacity of 
52 ROCCO BUTTIGLIONE 
 
Journal of East-West Though 
 
concretely thinking history and of understanding the philosophical meaning of 
change in history. 
Is it possible to use the ontological personalism of Seifert in order, not just to 
criticize, but also to correct Hegel? A usual confutation limits itself to explaining 
what is wrong and why and discards the whole work of the author because of its 
defects. A methodological correction sees the roots of the error and explains how 
the positive discoveries of a philosopher (of Hegel in this case) can be saved and 
founded on a more reliable ground.  
Can we read Hegel with new eyes? The question is not irrelevant and is not 
just a problem of philosophical archeology. The Hegelian philosophy was in a 
certain sense the definitive form of modernity and the crisis of modernity 
coincides largely with the crisis of Hegelian philosophy. It is not just a theoretical 
issue. That philosophy has been incarnate within the culture, in the uses and 
customs, in the institutions of a whole civilization. Some philosophers expected 
after the crisis of immanentism, philosophy would go back to classical realism 
and, society would retreat to the past. The contrary happened: philosophy moved 
forward towards postmodernism and the dominant social ideology became 
absolute relativism. A revision of Hegel's philosophy could disclose new horizons 
for a reform and a critical defense of modernity reconciled with classical realism. 
Perhaps it is worth the while to try it. 
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